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Thinking collectively about complex problems requires crossing boundaries both horizontally (across
disciplines) and vertically (across experts, policymakers, prac-
titioners, and the public) (Klein 2004). Although the debates
on climate change discussed elsewhere in this issue (Norgaard
and Baer 2005a) exemplify strong boundary crossing in both
dimensions, most scholars, when they venture into collective
thinking, may begin with collaborations that stress the more
academic, horizontal crossings. Much of the current inter-
disciplinary research on the environment is probably of this
kind, and it also tends to have a smaller geographical focus
than ongoing debates on climate change. Without gainsaying
the need for crossings in the vertical dimension, an analysis
of interdisciplinarity in this limited context can provide use-
ful insights into the problems generated by researchers’ dis-
ciplinary training and conditioning. In the context of working
with a team of scholars from several disciplines on a regional-
scale project, we explore the practical difficulties of partici-
pating in interdisciplinary research, drawing on our own
experience in the fields of forestry, biodiversity, and hydrol-
ogy, as well as other sources.
When scientists come together in such teams, it is usually
around some shared interest, such as conserving biological di-
versity or improving the food security of the poor. These
shared interests, however, do not translate into a research
plan with predetermined bridges between the disciplines.
Problems may show up early. When engaging with their col-
leagues in other fields, scientists typically find that their col-
leagues define the problem quite differently or seek different
types of answers. For a few, this is an exciting discovery that
energizes them to understand these differences. Many, how-
ever, decide that it takes too much effort to communicate and
share knowledge within such a disparate group, and happily
retreat to their own special fields, where all the participants
use the same models of analysis, are comfortable with the as-
sumptions they share as a group, and consequently “know”
the same things. The purpose of this article is to help re-
searchers who do choose to engage in interdisciplinary work
by identifying the barriers to interdisciplinarity in a way that
makes them easier to overcome. At the outset, we would like
to point out that the term “discipline” is a little too slippery
for a thorough analysis of the types of barriers that need to
be surmounted (box 1). But given that most of us are brought
up with these disciplinary labels, we will continue to use the
major disciplinary categories or blocks (the “natural”and the
“social” sciences) as a starting point, identifying the incon-
sistencies and subtleties as we go along. We should also men-
tion that, for the sake of brevity, we use the term
“interdisciplinarity” loosely to describe all types of crossings
between or among disciplines, glossing over the subtle dif-
ferences between multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinarity that
are highlighted in more elaborate discussions on this subject
(see, e.g., Kockelmans 1979).
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Practicing Interdisciplinarity
SHARACHCHANDRA LÉLÉ AND RICHARD B. NORGAARD
We explore the practical difficulties of interdisciplinary research in the context of a regional- or local-scale project. We posit four barriers to 
interdisciplinarity that are common across many disciplines and draw on our own experience and on other sources to explore how these barriers are
manifested. Values enter into scientific theories and data collection through scientists’ hidden assumptions about disciplines other than their own, through
the differences between quantitative and interpretive social sciences, and through roadblocks created by the organization of academia and the 
relationship between academics and the larger society. Participants in interdisciplinary projects need to be self-reflective about the value 
judgments embedded in their choice of variables and models. They should identify and use a core set of shared concerns to motivate the effort, be 
willing to respect and to learn more about the “other,” be able to work with new models and alternative taxonomies, and allow for plurality and 
incompleteness.
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We begin by outlining a common set of barriers that schol-
ars from different disciplines are likely to encounter when they
come together to work on a project. Next, we discuss which
barriers are most important and what shape they take when
working within the natural sciences. Third, we address the
more difficult problems of working across the natural and so-
cial sciences. One of the reasons it is so difficult for natural
scientists to work with social scientists is because the latter
themselves are divided, as we explain in more detail below.
Barriers to interdisciplinarity
We identified four major types of barrier to interdisciplinar-
ity. First, there is the problem of values being embedded in all
types of inquiry and at all stages: in the choice of questions,
theoretical positions, variables, and style of research. But cer-
tainly natural scientists, and even social ones, are loath to ac-
knowledge the presence of value judgments in their work.
Furthermore, in the context of contentious social issues (e.g.,
sustainable development), decisionmakers call on scientists
to provide “objective” advice, making such acknowledgment
even more difficult. Consequently, the collective judgment re-
quired in interdisciplinary research is especially difficult. It is
fraught with the possibility that scientists will “talk past each
other”because of the ways in which the disciplines assert eth-
ical neutrality and cast a blind eye to their own normative 
positions.
Second, researchers in different disciplines may study the
same phenomenon but differ in their theories or explanatory
models (and underlying assumptions). In the case of complex
phenomena, it is not easy to prove the superiority of one the-
ory over another in a particular case. Maintaining allegiance
to one’s school of thought may come to seem more impor-
tant than openly exploring which explanation seems to work
better in a particular context. This seems to be the case par-
ticularly within the social sciences, but it is also true for ecol-
ogy. The level of complexity of ecological phenomena, and
hence the underdeterminacy of the science, resembles the sit-
uation in the social sciences. On the other hand, sciences
that have developed at the borders of the social–natural di-
vide (e.g., agronomy in the natural sciences or agricultural eco-
nomics in the social sciences) are required to make some
assumptions about the processes that intrude from the other
side (e.g., the decisionmaking process of the farmer or the na-
ture of agroecosystems, respectively). These disciplinary as-
sumptions about the “other” half of the system constitute
simplistic models that must be abandoned and replaced by
more complex ones.
The third type of barrier is the one that has been most em-
phasized in the literature on interdisciplinarity: the differences
in epistemology and hence in specific methods, notions of ad-
equate proof, and other fundamental assumptions of differ-
ent fields. As Bauer (1990) puts it,“Scientists (and engineers)
believe implicitly in certain absolute truths, and further be-
lieve that given enough time and effort the ultimate truth can
be found, whereas for some philosophers, sociologists and
other [social scientists] there is no absolutely determinable
truth” (p. 106). These differences may exist even between
disciplines within each disciplinary block. Certainly a major
difference between the approaches of anthropologists and
economists is their differing perception about the objective
versus subjective nature of scientific knowledge and whether
it is context specific or general. Within the natural sciences,
although belief in the “knowability” of the world generally
reigns supreme, scientists studying complex processes such as
those in ecology have grappled with the question of how
much we can know through reductionist models and exper-
imentation (see, e.g., Botkin 1990).
Finally, the way in which society interacts with and orga-
nizes academia influences the production of interdiscipli-
nary research. As Schoenberger (2001) and others have
pointed out, the relative importance or validity of a direction
of inquiry or approach is not determined simply by some ob-
jective recognition by academics of its ability to generate
more valid knowledge than another approach. Forces at work
in a larger society outside academia shape the perception of
importance gained by a certain discipline, or by a particular
kind of interdisciplinary crossing. This generates differences
in the attention paid to (and resources commanded by) dif-
ferent disciplines, and consequently conditions behavioral pat-
terns, such as arrogance or defensiveness, among their
practitioners. Society also influences the institutional arrange-
ments within academia that create incentives or disincentives
for interdisciplinary knowledge production.
Below, we elaborate on these barriers to collective inter-
disciplinarity, and discuss more specific examples. We begin
with a brief discussion of the smallest divides or barriers—
that is, those within the natural sciences—followed by the big
divide between the natural and the social sciences, and then
the even bigger divide between the quantitative and the in-
terpretive social sciences.
Divides within the natural sciences 
Interdisciplinary thinking is easiest between disciplines within
the natural sciences, but even in this context, it is not pain-
less. The first kind of interdisciplinary barrier (difference in
values) is neither directly discernible nor easily separated
from the second (difference in theories, models, or world-
views). The judgment about what features of a natural phe-
nomenon are important seems simply a subjective
(individual-level) judgment about how to describe reality. But
when this process is carried out in the context of applied
science questions, it becomes clear that the question has two
parts: a value judgment about what features are of ultimate
concern or importance to society (such as productivity of use-
ful plant species) and a more “scientific” judgment about
what variables or features are most relevant in the effort to de-
scribe how these socially important features change (e.g.,
trophic structure of the community, species composition,
or physiology of individual species). Answers to the first
question are shaped by the individual’s normative concerns,
by the cultural trends within his or her subdisciplinary com-
munity, and also by the choice of the descriptive model itself
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(Lélé and Norgaard 1996). The choice of methods, driven by
different epistemological assumptions, also differs across
subdisciplines within a particular subject area. These judg-
ments and choices have different implications for work within
and across disciplines.
When scientists from two different natural sciences try to
work together, differences in value judgments and models
manifest in the form of what we call “mismatched tax-
onomies.” Scientists working in a subdiscipline often tend to
believe that their particular way of categorizing phenomena
(taxonomic system) is the best way of characterizing reality,
rather than being open to different ways of representing re-
ality that might be more or less appropriate in different ap-
plied contexts. For instance, for years soil scientists have been
debating as to which system of soil taxonomy is the best.
The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) soil taxonomy sys-
tem appears to have won the battle and become the most com-
monly accepted classification. But if the purpose of soil
classification is to relate soil types to forest vegetation types
or agricultural fertility, the USDA soil taxonomy is not very
useful. Indeed, when soil scientists shift from working on
fertility questions in agricultural soils to working on sus-
tainability questions in forests, they may have to change not
only their taxonomy but also their methods (typical soil
depths sampled, parameters analyzed, etc.). But once the
problem of mismatched taxonomies is recognized and ad-
dressed, communicating across disciplines in the natural sci-
ences becomes quite easy.
Collaboration between particular types of scientists within
the same broad area can also be difficult. Within the biolog-
ical sciences, in particular, there are significant differences in
the models used to study the same processes. This is largely
due to the difficulties of holding many factors constant in liv-
ing systems and investigating particular factors in the mode
of reductionist science. Thus, ecologists have to make some
strong assumptions about how a system works, and the as-
sumptions differ between approaches or schools. Energetics
models and their underlying assumptions, for example, dif-
fer fundamentally from the models and assumptions in com-
munity ecology, akin to the differences among patterns of
thinking in the social sciences. To some extent, these as-
sumptions are adjusted through tacit knowledge gained from
experience. Generally, natural scientists are fairly cognizant
of and comfortable with their differences with one another,
compared to their differences with social scientists. Natural
scientists are relatively open to working with each others’
judgments, and generally able to make the necessary con-
ceptual adjustments.
The main barrier to interdisciplinary work—for exam-
ple, to a collaboration between a botanist and a soil scientist—
lies in the relative absence of motivation. This in turn is
related to the last of the common barriers discussed in the pre-
vious section, namely, the link between science and society and
the structure of academia. Most scientists do not see the low
level of cross-disciplinary collaboration as a problem. Most
are happily addressing the questions that have already been
identified within disciplinary boundaries, in the belief that
pushing the frontiers of each discipline will eventually lead
to the convergence of all knowledge. Crossing boundaries to
solve environmental and development problems distracts
from pure research, where academic prestige is still highest.
Some funding agencies are trying to break down the hierar-
chy of pure over applied science as they increasingly support
applied research in their attempt to address pressing problems
of environmental change and poverty. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that the motivation for crossing disciplinary boundaries
even within the natural sciences remains generally low.
Bridging the big divide: Linking 
the natural to the social 
The divide between the two major disciplinary blocks (the 
natural and the social sciences) is large and multidimen-
sional. All four of the types of barriers identified above have
significant explanatory value.
The value-laden nature of science. What starts out in the pure
sciences as only a problem of subjective choice of taxonomies
or models burgeons into the issue of the value-laden nature
of natural science when working on phenomena of social rel-
evance. But most natural scientists have been brought up on
the notion that science is value neutral. This belief proves to
be a barrier both to working across disciplines and to doing
good science.
Take the example of forest management. Tropical forests
contribute a variety of benefits, but these benefits flow to dif-
ferent groups in society. Some of these benefits, such as fuel-
wood, fodder, leaf manure, timber, and minor produce, may
flow to communities living close to the forests, while water-
shed services flow primarily to those living in the plains
downstream, and carbon sequestration benefits accrue to
the entire global community. Different ways of managing
forests yield different mixes of benefits. Dense, undisturbed
forests yield high levels of biodiversity and watershed services,
but little by way of tangible products. Carefully managed,
lopped forests might yield high levels of fuelwood, fodder, and
leaf manure, but reduced levels of biodiversity and medium
levels of watershed benefits. Monocultural timber planta-
tions, on the other hand, would maximize timber production
at the expense of most other benefits. Some of the benefits gen-
erated by forests, such as fodder or fuel, may also result from
nonforest land uses, such as coffee plantations or croplands.
Thus, prioritizing forests over other land uses, and certain for-
est management systems over others, means valuing certain
benefits and certain beneficiaries over others. When one de-
cides which mix of benefits is correct, one is deciding how the
diverse needs of different sections of society and of present
versus future generations should be valued. This decision is
essentially a social or political one. Science can illuminate this
social debate by generating a clearer estimate of the trade-offs
and complementarities between different benefits, but science
cannot settle the debate.
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Furthermore, as noted earlier, judgments about what is 
socially valuable (what kind of forest should be sustained
over what period of time) are almost inextricably linked to the 
subjective choices of the dependent variables, the likely set of
independent variables, the functional form of the model,
and the scale of analysis. That these are value-loaded choices
becomes clear when one thinks of how different ecologists
might respond to the question, “What constitutes a good
forest?”The chances are that community ecologists might de-
fine this as a highly diverse forest, whereas energetics mod-
elers might define it as a highly productive forest.
Unfortunately, debates in forestry have often been fruitless
because they really are normative debates about what should
be the goal of forest management, not scientific debates about
which method of forest management will or will not achieve
a particular goal (or mix of benefits) in a sustainable manner.
For instance, in the Western Ghats region of India, colonial
foresters in the late 19th century were up in arms against the
local practice of lopping or pruning forest trees to obtain leaf
manure and fuelwood, and predicted that “such land must be-
come utterly barren”and that “ruin and desolation will be the
outcome” (MacGregor 1894). Foresters and ecologists in
postindependence India seemed to concur. However, rigor-
ous measurements showed that even a century after these dire
predictions, the extent of barren land was limited, and the pro-
ductivity of the intensively lopped forests was much higher
than estimated. Often (though not always) it was sufficient to
meet the harvesting pressures (Lélé 1994, 2000). Rather than
being a scientific judgment about what harvesting and man-
agement practices are sustainable, the foresters’ criticisms
seem to be driven by their underlying value judgment that such
intensive use of forests was inherently undesirable.
Natural scientists are usually uncomfortable with the idea
that “environmentally sound development” is not a self-
evident, value-neutral concept. They have attempted to hang
on to the cloak of value neutrality in different ways. For in-
stance, in the context of ecosystems, some scientists try to ar-
gue that sustaining biodiversity automatically sustains all
other products and services. Some try to portray ecosystem in-
tegrity, ecological health, natural capital, ecological footprint,
or a green GDP (gross domestic product), for example, as ob-
jective measures. One can easily show, however, that the cre-
ation of new concepts and aggregate measures in response to
a perceived problem does not get rid of value judgments.
Each of these concepts is relevant only with respect to a par-
ticular choice of ultimate values or variables of interest, or to
particular notions of how disparate values should be aggregated
(Lélé and Norgaard 1996, Bowker and Star 1999, Rykiel 2001).
When we attempt to bridge the big divide, such hidden
value judgments can cause serious problems.When social sci-
entists are insensitive to this problem, they may take the nat-
ural scientists’ assessment at face value, as an objective
assessment of the quality of resource management, and end
up taking their subsequent analysis further astray. For instance,
in the case of the heavily used forests in the Western Ghats,
Nadkarni and colleagues (1989) assumed that the forests
were degraded (à la MacGregor 1894) and then tried hard,
but with limited success, to explain why these individually 
controlled forests suffered a tragedy that is supposed to be 
restricted to the “commons” (Lélé 2000).
On the other hand, when social scientists do point out the
possible ways in which natural science may be value laden, nat-
ural scientists are likely to become upset and defensive. For
instance, in a workshop aimed at exposing economists to
basic hydrology, the hydrology expert introduced the concept
of “groundwater potential” and  “sustainable utilization.”
The latter was defined as the situation in which groundwa-
ter extraction does not exceed the rate of groundwater
recharge. At this point, an economist pointed out that this de-
finition was debatable, because if communities living in the
upper part of the watershed (typically where most of the
rain falls and recharge occurs) were to extract the entire
recharge, it would leave no water for downstream communities
or for base flow in the river. The hydrologist took quite some
time to understand the empirical point being made and,
even then, insisted that the official definition of sustainable
extraction was “correct.”
Assumptions about other disciplines. Natural scientists tend
to think of disciplinary differences as reflecting primarily
differences in the subject matter studied (and hence to think
of disciplinary perspectives as complementary). This means
they are unprepared for the competition and even open hos-
tility among social scientists from different fields. The vari-
ous schools of thought in the social sciences address individual
behavior and social interactions, but they do so using differ-
ent assumptions. Furthermore, they may use the same words
with different meanings, associated with different historical
lineages. This makes it difficult for natural scientists to know
which type of social scientist to work with.As a result, we have
“interdisciplines” such as ecological anthropology and eco-
logical economics. The ecological models in these interdisci-
plines may be the same, but the social science assumptions,
models, and language differ. Natural scientists need to expect
to take considerable time learning the cultures of the differ-
ent social sciences if they are even to think about how to put
together or join an interdisciplinary team, let alone actually
work with the social science members of the team.
At the same time, natural scientists must unlearn their
implicitly held social science theories. Natural scientists have
often been the first to point out environmental problems of
enormous social consequence. Naturally, they participate in,
and often lead, societal efforts to address these problems.
Charged with providing policy recommendations, they have
to make judgments about how society works. They do not have
adequate training to do this, but they are perhaps emboldened
to do so by their position and are likely to adopt simplistic
models of social dynamics. As a recent article in Nature put
it,“Few of us know much about the dynamics of the cosmos,
but we all know plenty about human nature—or at least we
think we do” (Anonymous 2005, p. 1003). Thus, natural 
scientists have applied models of biological carrying capac-
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ity to human systems even though, unlike other animals,
human beings constantly innovate and also respond to re-
source scarcity by varying their levels of consumption enor-
mously. Natural scientists have used proximity analysis to
assign blame for forest degradation, ignoring the fact that
property rights may shape forest use much more than prox-
imity. And of course natural scientists’ quick recourse to ig-
norance as an explanation of unexpected or seemingly
irrational behavior by poor communities ignores the logics
imposed by poverty. In short, seeming familiarity with social
issues can get in the way of recognition of the rigor and
depth of the “other” that is necessary for a true cross-
disciplinary collaboration.
Belittling the “other,”however, is by no means the preserve
of the natural sciences alone. Many social science theories and
their adherents have tended to ignore or underplay the con-
straints imposed by natural resources and processes on hu-
man actions. Even today, many economists continue to use
arguments based on economic models that assume an infi-
nite substitutability among resources through technological
change (Lomborg 2001). For others, such as hard-line Marx-
ists, technology matters but is entirely determined by social
factors, so it is not necessary to understand the relationship
between technologies and environmental systems.
A first step in countering this problem may be to refer to
the natural sciences as “unsocial”and the social sciences as “un-
natural” as an interdisciplinary team is forming. Acknowl-
edging what each side does not know may help promote the
individual honesty and humility necessary for all team mem-
bers to work together. A second step might be a careful choice
of linking variables that simultaneously capture the critical
social aspects of natural processes and the critical natural as-
pects of social practices. Forest ecologists studying the impact
of fuelwood collection on forests should distinguish between
differences in harvesting practices, such as the ratio of green
wood to deadwood extraction or the girth of saplings felled,
rather than simply focusing on tons of biomass (Lélé 1993).
Hydrologists should identify exactly which portion of stream-
flow or infiltration is useful to which community, rather
than giving gross values for these variables. And political sci-
entists should be more sensitive to the ecological dynamics
of a resource before trying to link group size or other variables
to the presence of collective action. In the long run, one can
expect this interaction to change the individual disciplinary
models to some extent. For instance, detailed research on pas-
toral communities in the Sahel by ecological anthropolo-
gists has contributed as much to overturning the equilibrium
model of grassland ecosystems in favor of the disturbance
model as has research by ecologists (Mace 1991).
Epistemological and methodological mismatches. Much has
been said about the epistemological differences between the
two disciplinary blocks as well as those within the social sci-
ences (Kanbur 2001). There is a general belief that natural sci-
ence is quantitative and therefore rigorous, whereas social
science is qualitative and therefore not rigorous. Most of the
assumptions underlying this belief, however, are invalid. Not
only has quantitative thinking been extensively adopted in the
social sciences, but, more important, qualitative thinking can
be as rigorous as quantitative thinking, and quantitative
thinking does not prevent bogus rigor arising out of patently
wrong assumptions (DeCanio 2003).
Of course, perceptions and preferences do not change eas-
ily. Thus, mathematical ecologists have shown a greater will-
ingness to collaborate with mathematical economists than
with other social scientists. But other approaches, such as po-
litical ecology and ecological anthropology, are also flourishing,
suggesting that the qualitative–quantitative divide is not a fun-
damental barrier to integration across the divide between the
social and natural sciences. Practical constraints might in
fact turn out to be more important. Understanding envi-
ronmental change caused by human actions (e.g., the effect
of deforestation on hydrology) requires sampling across dif-
ferent intensities of human-induced environmental changes
(e.g., watersheds with different levels of deforestation), keep-
ing other variables (e.g., rainfall and soils) constant. But to un-
derstand how these environmental changes affect human
communities and, more important, what factors influence hu-
man response to environmental change, researchers need
samples wherein the extent of environmental change is sim-
ilar (e.g., similarly deforested watersheds) and only one so-
cial factor varies (e.g., the strength of collective-action
institutions). Finding adequate samples of such situations in
the real world is virtually impossible, and studying even lim-
ited samples may require enormous resources, leading to
tensions about which questions to prioritize.
The social standing of the social and natural sciences. There
are significant differences in the manner in which society treats
the social and natural sciences (and disciplines within them).
These differences are reflected in the incentives and support
provided for, attention paid to, and hence attitudes culti-
vated toward the two disciplinary blocks. In most countries,
the natural science–social science divide is reinforced early on.
India, where the first author is located, is perhaps an ex-
treme case, where students are forced to choose between
“science”and “arts”as early as the 11th year of schooling, and
where the exposure to the arts, humanities, and social sciences
in the undergraduate science-related programs is minimal and
their status minimized. The undergraduate courses in the so-
cial sciences are completely bereft of the “natural.”The liberal
arts approach to education in the United States may be at the
other end of the spectrum, but the divide is still present.
More than just lack of exposure to the “other,” it is the clear
signals of superiority or inferiority that are communicated to
academicians (and by them to their students) that are a prob-
lem. Many societies, especially Asian ones, are constantly
telling students that, when choosing between science and
the arts and humanities, “science” is superior to “arts.” This
signal is reinforced at the undergraduate stage by the half-
hearted manner in which the social sciences are taught in most
professional courses. Naturally, the social sciences are seen as
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irrelevant, boring, and nonrigorous. Conversely, the social sci-
entists, because they purportedly were not good enough to get
into the “science stream,” are often in awe of the natural sci-
ences. The belief of the superiority of the natural scientists is
so deep-rooted that whenever social problems have the slight-
est technical dimension, politicians have traditionally called
on only technicians—the natural scientists—to help solve
them. Social scientists were only invited into the US National
Academy of Sciences in the 1950s, when natural scientists dis-
covered they could use their help (Simon 1996). Until the lat-
ter half of the 20th century in the developed world, and
more recently in the developing world, most governmen-
tal committees on natural resource management were con-
stituted solely of natural scientists and engineers. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC,
was initiated by (and its leadership is dominated by) nat-
ural scientists, even though the origins and impacts of
climate change are ultimately highly social. Not surprisingly,
then, it is economics—the social science discipline that has
modeled itself consciously on the natural sciences—that is
considered by laypeople and politicians alike as superior to
other social sciences.
Bridging the even bigger divide: Interdisciplinarity
within the social sciences 
We, the authors, have straddled the big divide between the nat-
ural and social sciences for some time and also have been in-
volved in various efforts to promote interdisciplinary research
on the environment. We can now attest that it is frequently
harder to bridge deep divisions within the social sciences
than between the natural sciences and particular social sci-
ences. Economists, sociologists, and anthropologists, for ex-
ample, may find it easier to interact with environmental
scientists than to work with one another. When multiple
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Disciplines are academic administrative artifacts. There is both a great deal in common across disciplines and much variety within them. In
the social sciences, market economic models are used in economics, anthropology, history, sociology, political science, public policy, and even
psychology; those from different disciplines who use these models may have more in common with each other than with those from the same
departments who use Marxist perspectives. The biological sciences have reorganized over the past quarter-century, dropping the historic dis-
ciplinary distinctions, for example, between the plant and animal world and organizing more on levels of analysis from the gene to the or-
ganism to the ecosystem.Yet evolutionary biology cuts across all levels of analysis, and ecologists use genetic techniques to understand ecological
systems and processes. Thus the structure of scientific knowledge and the differences in epistemologies, theories, and methods among sci-
entists have little to do with what have historically been called disciplines. So, when approaching collaborative work between scientists, for-
get disciplines; think scientific communities.
A scientific community is a group of scholars who share a characteristic. The characteristic may be in one or more of the following epistemic
categories:
• Subject focus (e.g., a species, economic systems, a region, or society and technology). Some universities have regional studies pro-
grams, society and technology programs, or other interdisciplinary institutions with faculty participating from multiple depart-
ments.
• Assumptions about underlying characteristics of the factors they study (e.g., the assumption that individuals are rational utility
maximizers and a population can be understood as the sum of its individuals or, alternatively, that culture guides individual behav-
ior and individuals can only be understood in the context of their culture).
• Assumptions about the larger world they do not study, and about how what they do study relates to the larger world (e.g., the
assumption that the external environment is predictable because it is constant or exhibits regular patterns, or is unpredictable
because it is complex or chaotic; the assumption that the long run is not important, or need not be considered, because technologi-
cal progress is unpredictable or offsets resource scarcity). Such framing assumptions can serve as rationales for not considering
more systemic questions.
• The models they use (e.g., mechanical, hierarchical, evolutionary, narrative). Note that, in the current climate of academia, formal
models, especially mathematical models, give more credibility to a community.
• The methods they use (e.g., mathematical, statistical, interpretive, ethnographic).
• The audience they strive to inform through their research (e.g., other academics, policymakers, professional practitioners, a demo-
cratic public, corporations).
Holding a common characteristic in any of these categories can be a source of scholarly community. Scholars who use statistical techniques
can share their statistical knowledge without having to share anything in the other five categories. Two scholars who work in the Amazon can
usually talk for hours, even if they differ in the other categories. Of course, if the Amazon scholars start to argue over Adam Smith versus Karl
Marx, their camaraderie can quickly break down. Clearly, sharing characteristics in more categories reduces differences and provides a
stronger sense of community. Scholars within a tight community can work easily together because of all that they share, but the scholars who
are most dependent on the security of sharing characteristics across the different categories are least able to work with scholars from other
communities.
Note that not all combinations of characteristics across the categories are possible. Looking at a subject as a separate entity (individualism,
atomism, or reductionism) and using mechanistic models are compatible with statistical techniques of analysis. Interpretive methods and story-
telling are consistent with seeing everything as contextual (place specific), contingent (dependent on history), and interlinked.
Box 1. Forget disciplines, think scientific communities.
(continued)
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strains of social scientists all work on the same topic, they seem
to talk past each other. The reasons include all four of the main
barriers to interdisciplinarity discussed above.
Hidden values. Of all the social scientists, mainstream econ-
omists are most prone to holding on to illusions of value neu-
trality, albeit in disguise. For instance, mainstream welfare
economists aggregate costs and benefits across disparate sec-
tions of society to come up with a measure of net changes in
aggregate social welfare. In virtually all valuation studies and
cost–benefit analyses, this aggregation is done by simple 
addition (i.e., assuming that the effect of an additional dol-
lar to the poor is the same as to the rich). When confronted,
these economists acknowledge that this additive construction
of social welfare function is not value neutral, but there are
only a few examples of studies in which a social welfare func-
tion is calculated in different ways to represent different pos-
sible value positions (for an example, see Howarth 2001). The
pervasive discourse about “getting prices right” is another il-
lustration. The belief that there is one right price contra-
dicts basic economic theory, because different distributions
of rights, or income, result in different combinations of effi-
cient market prices.
Other social scientists are less likely to insist that their po-
sition is value neutral, but they are nonetheless rarely explicit
about what values they espouse, and thus end up talking past
each other. In a detailed review of the literature on common
property resources, Menon (1999) has pointed out how dif-
ferent streams in this literature talk past each other because
their underlying normative concerns are different: the col-
lective-action stream focuses on efficiency improvements
in resource management, the environmentalist stream focuses
on ecological prudence or sustainability, and the poverty
stream focuses on the distributive impacts, that is, on impacts
of common property resource degradation on the poor.
One can detect a reasonably clear correlation between these
three schools and their disciplinary roots: the collective-
action approach is linked to the rational-choice ideas in
mainstream economics and political science, the environ-
mentalist approach has strong links with the natural 
sciences, and the poverty approach is closer to the anthro-
pologists and sociologists. The correlation is certainly not 100
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Understanding how the parts of the scientific endeavor do or do not fit together is another important concern for interdisciplinary commu-
nities. Some scholars are sure the sciences will unify; they seek that unity, and are convinced that the current disunity means some scholarly
communities must be wrong. Other scholars are comfortable with the disunity of knowledge; they are methodological pluralists, and are not
disturbed by competing, and sometimes contradictory, insights. Either type of scholar may be able to work with other scholars of the same
type (unifying or pluralistic) on a problem that requires cooperation between other characteristics of communities, but there are serious ten-
sions when scholars of different persuasions with respect to the unity of knowledge try to cooperate in an interdisciplinary effort.
These categories do not exhaust the criteria that define scientific communities. Scholars in the philosophy and sociology of science have de-
veloped a variety of insights into the ways in which personal networks, specific practices, and various forms of tacit knowledge characterize
the organization of the modern scientific enterprise, as well as the ways in which that organization has changed over time (see box 2 in Nor-
gaard and Baer [2005b] for some useful citations). Our point here is to highlight some of the most salient characteristics that facilitate or im-
pede interdisciplinary communication.
Strong scientific communities actively demarcate and defend their boundaries. Most scientific communities are constantly defining themselves,
reinforcing why their knowledge is credible, and seeking recognition, authority, and power. Such active communities tout the strengths of their
approach to truth and reassert the superiority of their answers. Scholars who drift too far from commonly held characteristics of the com-
munity—perhaps in the assumptions they make or their orientation with respect to those they serve, and hence in the nature of the claims
about truth that they make—are actively defined as being outside of the community. Praising the good work of those who best represent the
community and what it has to say and weeding out those who stray is a part of the process of sustaining the identity and credibility of the
community. This means that the social needs of the community can get in the way of openly acknowledging the limits of the particular as-
sumptions or models favored by the community, impeding critical thinking and innovation.
Interdisciplinarity is about working across boundaries. The boundaries are those that define communities and that communities are constantly
trying to enforce, so being aware of the different types of boundaries helps one see more clearly the ways in which scholars are different and
the sorts of boundaries that need to be overcome, or at least recognized, to work together. Clearly, when there are many boundaries to over-
come, it is especially hard to work together. It is also important to recognize the social dynamics of communities, the ways in which they re-
inforce their identity and credibility through boundary building and enforcement. When first trying to work with a scholar from another
community, it is important to be respectful of that community’s traditions and to be aware of the limitations of one’s own perspective.
Although interdisciplinary scholars must initially learn how to cross boundaries, once there is a significant set of scholars crossing a common
set of boundaries, or once a smaller number of scholars organizes themselves to encourage others to do so, they are subject to the same so-
cial needs to define the boundaries and assert the credibility of the new community. This may be academically necessary and even useful, but
can also stifle attempts at new crossings in the long run.
In sum, it is crucial to recognize that while simple maps of the scientific enterprise still match the organizational charts of universities, these
are far from the most important markers of difference and similarity that interdisciplinary scholarship must address. Commonalities exist at
many different scales and in many dimensions; scientific communities are both nested and overlapping. Understanding these complexities
can make the problem seem tougher at the outset, but should make it easier in practice.
(Box 1, continued)
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percent, but the fundamental problem remains. Much aca-
demic debate on the commons starts off on the wrong foot
by not explicating what each participant’s normative concerns
and priorities are, and by failing to recognize how participants’
individual models make it difficult to accommodate other
normative concerns.
Competing explanations. The problem of interdisciplinarity
within the social sciences cannot, unfortunately, be solved sim-
ply by choosing a common set of values or variables of con-
cern. All social science disciplines are ultimately attempting
to understand the same broad phenomenon, human behav-
ior.At the cost of some simplification, one might say that each
social science discipline (or subdiscipline) makes different 
assumptions about the key driver or drivers of human be-
havior. Mainstream economists believe the key driver is ma-
terial benefits, certain schools within sociology believe it is
power, and certain schools within anthropology believe it is
cultural norms and value systems. These basic assumptions
are not prima facie mutually incompatible, and no doubt dif-
ferent combinations of interactive phenomena are more im-
portant at different levels of explanation. They are, of course,
incompatible within any simple model. Disagreements within
the social sciences, however, are therefore extremely deep-
rooted, in part because of a mistaken belief (left over from
19th-century physics) that social phenomena ought to be
explained, or largely explained, by a few universal principles.
Different explanations of environmental degradation il-
lustrate how social science disciplines compete. Neoclassical
economists insist that the problem lies in missing markets or
in the improper setting of prices of resources and pollutants.
Political economists focus on the fact that different economic
classes have different levels of access to natural resources,
and the material consumption and pollution by the power-
ful classes comes at the cost of the less powerful. Institution-
alists explain resource degradation in terms of the failure of
institutions to properly assign rights and responsibilities so
that market and other systemic failures do not occur. Ecofem-
inists have argued that environmental degradation is related
to the domination of women by men, while anthropologists
have argued that it is related to how human beings perceive
their relationship with nature. Mahatma Gandhi pointed
out that “there is enough for every man’s need but not every
man’s greed,” suggesting (somewhat like an anthropologist)
that we have to look within ourselves and our value systems
rather than the structure of society for the causes of envi-
ronmental degradation. This is not to deny that some very in-
teresting and fruitful disciplinary crossings are taking place
within the social sciences. But they do not seem to have af-
fected the mainstreams in the disciplines. The reason may be
that the very identities of some of the disciplines or subdis-
ciplines rest on the belief that their own explanatory model
or method is the superior one. This is certainly true of the
mainstream economists and their rational choice model,
which has had a hegemonic position in the social sciences.
One approach to interdisciplinarity in the social sciences
might be to assume that all these explanations have general
validity, but that in specific cases one explanation may be su-
perior to the others. Underlying this approach is a view of hu-
man beings as having multiple personalities: the economic
personality asserts itself in the market, the political one in elec-
tions, and some other personality in the interaction between
the genders. Sometimes human beings are driven by mater-
ial considerations and sometimes by cultural factors. This may
be related to the traditional idea that different disciplines ex-
plain human behavior at different levels: the household, the
community, the nation, and so on. In this situation, one
needs some kind of metatheoretical procedure for deter-
mining a priori which one of several possible explanations is
likely to be appropriate in a specific context. To use such a pro-
cedure, researchers would need to train extensively in differ-
ent social science theories, without absorbing the dogmas
associated with each theory, so that they could pick and
choose depending on the situation.
Eventually, social scientists need to figure out ways of
working with several theoretical frameworks that may be si-
multaneously plausible. For instance, the failure of a partic-
ular institution of common-pool resource management may
be rooted both in the norms inherent in cultural explanations
and in the disproportionate distribution of power assumed
in political economy explanations. Given the differences in
scale of operation of these factors, testing such multicausal
frameworks through some kind of statistically rigorous ap-
proach is an insurmountable task through formal analysis. This
means that researchers who address multicausal, interacting
phenomena must rely on an open discourse to take advan-
tage of the different theoretical frameworks and tacit knowl-
edge associated with different fields, and to come to a
measured, qualified judgment.
The epistemological and hence methodological divide
separating mainstream economists from anthropologists
and other interpretive social scientists—with economists
equating rigor with quantitative methods and mathematical
models— is quite well known (Bardhan 1989). It explains why
mathematical ecologists find it easiest to collaborate with
economists (Perrings et al. 1995), whereas natural historians
are perhaps more comfortable working with anthropolo-
gists (Maffi 2001). Sadly, this divide has even manifested it-
self within recent efforts to address environmental issues
from within economics, with hard-nosed “environmental”
economists (especially in the United States) finding it 
difficult to accept the contributions of the more pluralistic
“ecological” economists.
The higher social standing of economics vis-à-vis other 
social science disciplines, and the consequent tensions between
these disciplines, is also something that has been commented
upon, with the hierarchy being strongest in developing coun-
tries such as India. This may be partly explained by the ap-
parent quantitative rigor and exact prediction that economics
shares with the natural sciences. But the main explanation may
lie in the commonality of values and worldviews between a
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certain subdiscipline of economics (mainstream neoclassical
economics) and those institutions that are currently setting
the developmental agenda.
Concluding remarks
Doing collective interdisciplinary research, especially projects
stressing the feedbacks between social and environmental
systems, is difficult at the best of times.Yet surely most efforts
fail before they get seriously under way because the partici-
pants from different intellectual communities never recognize
the barriers created by their separate ways of understanding
and approaching problems.We have provided a bird’s-eye view
of some of the important barriers scientists need to under-
stand in order to overcome them.
We have argued that participants in interdisciplinary re-
search projects must overcome various biases and prejudices
that accompany disciplinary training. Contrary to their dis-
ciplinary training, participants need to be self-reflective about
the value judgments embedded in their choice of variables and
models, willing to give respect to and also learn more about
the “other,” and able to work with new models and tax-
onomies used by others. Even with apparently well-integrated
models, the project team needs to keep thinking flexibly and
allowing for plurality and incompleteness. In this sense, the
collective judgments and synthetic interpretations made in in-
terdisciplinary environmental research may have to be more
interpretive, as in some social sciences, than the positivist ap-
proach of the natural sciences and mainstream economics. At
the same time, there has to be a core set of shared socioenvi-
ronmental concerns—some ab initio, some negotiated—
that would provide the motivation to sustain what can often
be an exhausting effort.
This is not to suggest that shared concerns, greater self-
reflectivity, and cross-disciplinary exposure will suffice. To 
promote interdisciplinary research at large, individual- and
team-level must be complemented by strategies with major
institution-level changes in curricula, incentives, evaluation
criteria, and accountability. These may not be in the hands of
individuals who seek to do interdisciplinary work; however,
some of these constraints could be eased at the outset of
major interdisciplinary projects (e.g., by getting parent 
institutions to agree that the outputs that emerge should not
be weighed by conventional disciplinary or departmental
standards). A better understanding of the barriers would
also help better design interdisciplinary teaching programs.
Reflecting on how to think across academic disciplines is
only a first step toward bridging the various divides involved
in collectively addressing complex environmental problems.
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